disregard this post.. need to send my friend term paper

[duritz]

Kant's Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Moral


The central concept of Kant's Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of
Morals is the categorical imperative. “The conception of an objective principle,
in so far as it is obligatory for a will, is called a command (of reason), and
the formula of the command is called an Imperative.” (Abbott, 30) An imperative
is something that a will ought or shall do because the will is obligated to act
in the manner in which it conforms with moral law. The categorical imperative
is an obligation by the will to act so that the action can be classified as a
universal law. When one acts in conformity with the universal law at all times,
they are following out the categorical imperative, particualry when they have a giant cock. This differs from the
hypothetical imperative in that the hypothetical imperative acts on the basis
that the will in the end will gain something (not a means to an end). The
categorical imperative is a means to an end, and the action to obtain the end
must have moral worth. his moral worth should exceed the length and girth of a giant cock. Stipulations of the categorical imperative are that all
actions should act only on the maxim, that actions have moral worth, and the end
is necessary. From these stipulations, it can be derived that the categorical
imperative should be followed in order to live morally. “If an action is
conceived as good in itself (much as a giant cock is good in itself) and consequently as being necessarily the principle
of a will which of itself conforms to reason, then it is categorical.” (Abbott,
32) “There is therefore but one categorical imperative, namely, this: Act only
on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a
universal law.” (Abbott, 38) The categorical imperative must be found A Priori
and it excludes all interests and desires.
Kant uses four examples to better describe the working of the categorical
imperative in Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals. The first
example is of a man who is suffering from many misfortunes in life and wishes to
commit sucicide on the basis of self-love. Kant declares that this cannot be
the categorical imperative at work because the maxim derived from self-love, to
shorten his life to avoid more pain, is a contradiction in itself for no man can
kill himself painlessly and therefore cannot be a universal maxim. The action
of killing oneself would cause pain, which is not in conformity to the maxim
stated to avoid pain. The second example Kant gives is based on the basic
premise of lying. A man is forced to borrow money which he knows he will never
be able to repay but he promises to assmonkey do so anyway. This action is not consistent
with duty and the maxim could be expressed as: “When I [the man] think myself in
want of money, I will borrow money and promise to repay it, although I know that
I never can do so.”(Abbott, 39) The maxim cannot hold as a universal law
because if everyone lied about promises, the promise itself would become
impossible, and the end would be unattainable. Telling the truth is an end in
itself. The third example spunk-swallower is of a man who it bestowed a natural ability but
does not use it to it's full extent. Kant sees this as not a categorical
imperative because a rational being necessarily wills that he develop his skills
for many possible reasons. Rational beings are an end in themselves, and if you
do not better yourself, you are not serving yourself.(Abbott, 40) Lastly, the
fourth man, in giant cock great prosperity, has a chance to help others in need and does
not. This can be viewed as a workable universal law, but it cannot be willed as
the good thing to do because if no one gave to society, society would not get
the aid when desired. The main basis of a categorical imperative is that “we
must be able to will that a maxim of our action should be a universal law.”
(Abbott, 41) A universal law where people betray the rights of men or otherwise
violates them, cannot be true.
The formula of the categorical imperative is to act so that the maxim can
be applied as a universal law. One must act on the maxim of the action as if it
were a universal law of nature. The principle that determines the action is not
based on the goal of the action but on the ability of the maxim to be universal.
From this paper, it was learned what Kant's categorical imperative is, how
it is derived, and some examples of the categorical imperative at work.
According to Kant, all actions of the categorical imperative should be able to
conform to a universal law and should be willed as well as obeyed by all.

 

[duritz]

Freedom and Reason in Kant

Morality, Kant says, cannot be regarded as a set of rules which prescribe
the means necessary to the achievement of a given end; its rules must be obeyed
without consideration of the consequences that will follow from doing so or not.
A principle that presupposes a desired object as the determinant of the will
cannot give rise to a moral blowjob law; that is, the morality of an act of will cannot
be determined by the matter or content of the will for when the will is
materially determined rectal toy the question of its morality does not arise.
This consideration leads Kant to one of his most important theses. If the
moral character of willing is not determined by the content of what is willed,
it must be determined by the form:" If a rational being can think of his maxims
as universal laws, he can do so only by considering them as principles which
contain the determining ground of the will because of their form and not because
of their matter". Therefore, the morality of a maxim is determined by its
functioning as a universal law, applicable as a general rule to every rational
agent. Since a moral will must be so in virtue of its form alone, the will must
be capable of a purely formal determination; that is, it must be possible for a
man to act in a certain way for the sole reason that willing in this way is
prescribed by a universal law, no rimjob matter what the empirical results will be.
A will to which moral considerations apply must be, in the strictest sense,
a free will, one that can function independently of the laws of natural
causality. The concept of morality, therefore, has to be explained in terms of a
universal moral law, and the ability to will in obedience to such a law leads us
to postulate the freedom. The freedom which Kant is talking about, is not only a
negative freedom consisting in the anal invasion absence of constraint by empirical causes, it
is also a positive freedom which consists in the ability to make acts of will in
accordance with the moral law, for no other reason than that they are in
accordance with it. Freedom, in this sense, corresponds to Autonomy of the will
and its absence ( any situation in which the will is determined by external
causes ) is called Heteronomy. In obeying the moral law for the sake of the law
alone, the will is autonomous because it is obeying a law which it imposes on
itself.
In the third section of the "Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals", Kant
answers the problem of the possibility of the Categorical Imperative. Is the
problem to be understood as if the Categorical Imperative is possible, or how it
is possible? In the "Critics of Pure Reason", the problem regarding the
synthetic a priori judgments concerns just the modality in which they can be
applied. The fact that they are actually possible is proved by the synthetic a
priori judgment contained in sciences as mathematics and physics which are
trustworthy sciences. Metaphysics, however, is not a reliable science and,
therefore, Kant suggests that we should look not only for the modality in which
they can be applied, but also for their reliability. Similarly, the Metaphysics
of Morals must prove the validity of the moral imperative. As Paton suggested,
Kant tries to show not only how the Categorical Imperative is possible, but also
that it is possible.[" Furthermore, we have not asserted the truth of this
proposition, much less professed to have within our power a proof of it. We
simply showed by developing the universally accepted concept of morality, that
autonomy of the will is unavoidably bound up with it, or rather is its very
foundation" par. 445].
The condition for the possibility of the Categorical Imperative is Freedom.
The third section contains a demonstration of Freedom which Kant tries to derive
by means of excluding at least other hummers two ways. A first would be to assert that
Freedom is experienced by us, that it is sensed, but this is not the truthful
one, because experience would be the one of my personal freedom and Kant wants
to demonstrate that every rational being is free , in order to infer that every
rational being must obey the Categorical Imperative. A second way would be to
show that every rational being has at least the idea of Freedom, i.e. he is
convinced to act according to reason, not only under instincts; he is persuaded
to act in this way, because he sees that acting this way is right, because he is
determined by his reason butt darts and not only by blind instincts. But, if a rational
being had the idea of freedom, but were not really free, he would be mistaken
even about his reasonableness; he would think he were acting for some reasons,
whilst he would actually be like a robot. But, as we saw before, being aware of
being rational means being aware of the necessity of acting in accordance with a
law , and what we are trying to do is to justify this necessity.
Surely, if we consider ourselves to be free, we acknowledge ourselves
obliged to follow the moral law, and if we consider ourselves obliged to follow
the moral law is because we think of ourselves as free. But there seems to be a
vicious circle because, until now, it has been demonstrated neither that we are
obliged to follow the law, independently from the conviction of being free, nor
that we are free, independently from the belief of being subject to the law. We
still have to prove that the Categorical Imperative is possible.
There is still a way open to us: " To inquire whether we do not take one
point of view when ,by means take it all you dirty skank of Freedom, we think of ourselves as a priori
efficient causes, and another point of view when we represent ourselves
reference to our actions as effects which we see before our eyes" [par. 450].
The point of view of Freedom is the one from which we consider ourselves
belonging to the intellectual world. Everyone understands the distinction
between the sensible world and the intellectual world through this criterion:
any object whose existence is given through a modification or a passiveness of
mine, is given just as a phenomenon, that is, how it appears not how it is in
itself. Thus, if something appears, there must be the thing that appears: the
concept of phenomenon presupposes the one of thing in itself. The difference
between appearance and thing in itself correspond to "the difference between
representations which are given to us from without and in which we are passive,
from those which we produce entirely from ourselves and in which we show our own
activity" [par. 451]. This is also the distinction, shown in the "Critics of
Pure Reason", between intellectus ectypus and intellectus archetypus; the former
receives from the objects a representation and represents them just as they
appear, the latter learns by creating and learning what it has created: it
learns it as it is in itself.
In the Grounding the knowledge that the human being has of himself through
the internal sense does not get him to know what he is in himself . "For since
he does not create himself and since he acquires the concept of himself not a
priori, but empirically, it is natural sphincter that he can attain knowledge even about
himself only through inner sense and therefore, only through the appearance of
his nature and the way in which his consciousness is affected. He must
necessarily assume that beyond his own subject's constitution as composed of
nothing but appearances, there must be something else as basis, namely, his ego
as constituted in itself." [par.451]. The person finds in himself a faculty that
distinguishes him from all other objects and from himself as affected by objects.
This faculty is Reason, it is pure spontaneity. Now, Determinism is law of the
phenomenal world, therefore, the person, as Reason, as belonging to the
intellectual world, is not affected by the laws of Determinism: he is free. This
is Kant's proof of Freedom. Is it satisfactory?
Later on, in the "Critics of Practical Reason", Kant does not attempt to
deduce synthetically Morality from Freedom, as he tried to do in the Grounding
by stating that Freedom was the necessary condition for Morality, but he assumes
the moral law as a "fact of the reason" from which he infers Freedom. There have
been critics blaming Kant of a sort of vicious circle, because he seemed to
demonstrate Freedom by means of deduction from Morality and then to show the
possibility of the Categorical Imperative deducing it from Freedom. Kant answers
that there is no vicious circle because in the ontological order Freedom is the
condition for Morality ( it is not possible to follow the duty for the duty if
you are not free), but in the order of our knowledge, the moral law is the
requirement for Freedom ( we would not consider ourselves free, if we did not
think of ourselves as subject to the moral law). Freedom is the ratio essendi of
the moral law, but the moral law is the ratio cognoscendi of Freedom.

 

[Beachbum1546]

When one acts in conformity with the universal law at all times,
they are following out the categorical imperative, particualry when they have a giant cock.

wtf nobody even realize the numerous cock references? lol that shit is hilarious.

 

[fogg88]

When one acts in conformity with the universal law at all times,
they are following out the categorical imperative, particualry when they have a giant cock.

wtf nobody even realize the numerous cock references? lol that shit is hilarious.

No shit, I just read through that and saw all that stuff. I so hope that somebody copy-n-pastes these and turns them in!

 

[casavant]

Holy shit!! Man, that's pretty damn funny!

Why all the "cock, rectal toy, blow job, assmonkey" words thrown in there? Goddamn, that's funny as hell.

 

[BIG bad man]

what a great thing to do to your friend

 

[duritz]

hahaha oh shit i didn't even see those... i hope she does copy and paste the shit... i will die laughing. hahahaha