Please Scroll Down to See Forums Below
S
Spartacus
Guest
Stalingradjnuts said:
in this pic I participated with a German rennectment unit
I'm in the center
the guy to my left is US military
he was the leader
he's in Iraq now
S
Spartacus
Guest
he participated as an advisor for the filming of stalingrad
S
Spartacus
Guest
beefcake28
New member
The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge/Chapter VIII - Wikisource
sector. The 560th Volks Grenadier Division (Generalmajor Rudolf Langhaeuser) was assigned two specific bridges as targets, one just north of Ouren, the other a stone arch a little to the
south of the village. Because surprise was essential in this stroke for the bridges, artillery fire on the American forward positions in the first moments of the assault was forbidden.
l The heavy barrage and the pyrotechnic display which opened elsewhere on the 28th Division front on 16 December was viewed at first with some detachment by the men at the 112th
observation posts. They heard, and duly reported, heavy artillery to the south, they saw searchlights and flames lighting up the sky, but again in the south. About 0620, however, the 1st
Battalion phoned to say that shells were coming over the battalion command post. The German guns and Werfers had finally opened fire to neutralize or destroy the rearward artillery and
reserve positions in the 112th sector. As the enemy gun layers dropped their range back to the river and then to the American positions, the searchlights blinked on, searching out pillboxes
and bunkers. When daylight came, the German infantry already were stealing through the draws behind and around the forward platoons, aiming to assemble in the wooded areas to the
rear.14
l The 3d Battalion (Maj. Walden F. Woodward), in the regimental center, was hit by the 1130th Regiment of the 560th Volks Grenadier Division. This German blow fell on either side of
Sevenig, held by Company L. The American barbed wire line had not been completed across the draws to the north and south of the village; through these gaps the shock companies
advanced. The company leading the left battalion surprised a platoon of Company L at breakfast, overran the company kitchen (which was only 800 to goo yards behind the rifle line) and
killed the platoon commander. Leaderless, the platoon broke. A part of the German company, perhaps a platoon in strength, succeeded in reaching the stone bridge over the Our south of
Ouren, but was dispersed.
l The bulk of the 3d Battalion held their positions despite surprise, defending from pillboxes and foxholes. Later the Americans in this sector reported that the attackers must have been
"awfully green"-as indeed they were. The enemy attempt to capture or destroy the American command posts, kitchens, and observation posts was only partially successful, although the
grenadier assault parties were well inside the 3d Battalion positions when day broke. Two company kitchens were captured and one or two observation posts cut off, but the artillery
observer inside Sevenig was able to direct the 229th Field Artillery howitzers onto the Germans in the draw. Meanwhile the mortar crews took a hand from their foxholes on the hill behind
Sevenig, dropping mortar shells into the hollows where the Germans congregated or picking them off with carbines.
l Early morning reports of considerable German penetration and the threat to the Our bridges in the 3d Battalion area led the regimental commander to put one of his counterattack plans into
operation. At 0930 two companies of the 2d Battalion (Lt. Col. J. L. MacSalka) assembled in a draw between Ouren and Lieler (west of the river), crossed the bridges the German patrol at
the stone bridge had evaporated under machine gun fire-and moved toward Sevenig. The Germans in the way quickly withdrew to the east. By nightfall the 3d Battalion line on the Sevenig
ridge had been restored while the commander of the 1130th reported that his regiment, despite many attempts, had not been able "to get going."
l The main effort launched by the LVIII Panzer Corps on 16 December was assigned the 116th Panzer Division. This attack aimed at the bridges near Burg Reuland (in the 106th Division
sector) and Oberhausen, in the rear of the positions manned by the left battalion of the 112th. General Waldenburg committed his infantry here, in the predawn hours, hoping that the 60th
Regiment would break through on the right or that the 156th Regiment would reach the river on the left and so secure a bridgehead through which his tank regiment could be passed. The
lay of the ground and defenses in the area north of Lützkampen were such that Waldenburg's right regiment had to move northwestward at an oblique to the axis of his left wing advance.
l In common with the German assault tactics employed all along the front on 16 December, both regiments led off with a predawn advance by shock companies eighty men strong. The
company from the 60th ran into trouble almost immediately when it was immobilized in some woods northwest of Berg by flanking fire from Heckhuscheid, in the 424th Infantry sector.
Later reports indicate that this group was almost wiped out. The assault company from the 156th was initially more fortunate in its advance west of Lützkampen. By 0630 the grenadiers
were behind the command post of the 1st Battalion (Lt. Col. William H. Allen) in Harspelt; the first sign of their presence was a kitchen truck ambushed while journeying to the rear. The
advance party of grenadiers had moved along the wooded draw between the two companies holding the 1st Battalion line.
l When day came the Americans caught the troops following the advance party of the assault company out in the open. Interlocking machine gun and rifle fire blocked off the German
reinforcements some sixty were captured and the rest dug in where they could. Company D, in its support position on the high ground overlooking Lützkampen, meanwhile commenced
mopping up the enemy who had filtered between the companies on the line. By noon Company D had so many prisoners that it "couldn't handle them all!" Nonetheless some part of the
assault wave had broken through as far as the battery positions near Welchenhausen, where they were repelled by the .50-caliber quadruple mounts of the antiaircraft artillery.
l Shortly before noon the advance guard of the 60th Panzer Regiment, rolling along the Lützkampen-Leidenborn road, appeared on the knoll west of Lützkampen. The seven tanks counted
here strangely enough made no effort to attack (perhaps the rough terrain and dragon's teeth along the American bunker line did not appear too promising) . After a brief pause they wheeled
back into Lützkampen. 15 About dark infantry from Lützkampen attacked in close order formation against Company B. Maps picked up from dead Germans showed that the American
machine gun positions had been exactly plotted-but as they had existed up to a change made just before the 16th. The enemy made three attacks in the same close formation over the same
ground before they discovered the error of their ways. Company B, however, had been badly shot up during the engagement and probably somewhat shaken by the presence of two or three
flame-throwing tanks-a new experience to most American troops on the Western Front. Nevertheless by midnight the 1st Battalion front had quieted down, although there still were small
http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Ardennes:_Battle_of_the_Bulge/Chapter_VIII (14 of 24)2/5/2007 10:32:24 PM
This guy was a hero... Led the first successful retailation at the Battle of the Bulge... I dated one of his granddaughters for a few years.
sector. The 560th Volks Grenadier Division (Generalmajor Rudolf Langhaeuser) was assigned two specific bridges as targets, one just north of Ouren, the other a stone arch a little to the
south of the village. Because surprise was essential in this stroke for the bridges, artillery fire on the American forward positions in the first moments of the assault was forbidden.
l The heavy barrage and the pyrotechnic display which opened elsewhere on the 28th Division front on 16 December was viewed at first with some detachment by the men at the 112th
observation posts. They heard, and duly reported, heavy artillery to the south, they saw searchlights and flames lighting up the sky, but again in the south. About 0620, however, the 1st
Battalion phoned to say that shells were coming over the battalion command post. The German guns and Werfers had finally opened fire to neutralize or destroy the rearward artillery and
reserve positions in the 112th sector. As the enemy gun layers dropped their range back to the river and then to the American positions, the searchlights blinked on, searching out pillboxes
and bunkers. When daylight came, the German infantry already were stealing through the draws behind and around the forward platoons, aiming to assemble in the wooded areas to the
rear.14
l The 3d Battalion (Maj. Walden F. Woodward), in the regimental center, was hit by the 1130th Regiment of the 560th Volks Grenadier Division. This German blow fell on either side of
Sevenig, held by Company L. The American barbed wire line had not been completed across the draws to the north and south of the village; through these gaps the shock companies
advanced. The company leading the left battalion surprised a platoon of Company L at breakfast, overran the company kitchen (which was only 800 to goo yards behind the rifle line) and
killed the platoon commander. Leaderless, the platoon broke. A part of the German company, perhaps a platoon in strength, succeeded in reaching the stone bridge over the Our south of
Ouren, but was dispersed.
l The bulk of the 3d Battalion held their positions despite surprise, defending from pillboxes and foxholes. Later the Americans in this sector reported that the attackers must have been
"awfully green"-as indeed they were. The enemy attempt to capture or destroy the American command posts, kitchens, and observation posts was only partially successful, although the
grenadier assault parties were well inside the 3d Battalion positions when day broke. Two company kitchens were captured and one or two observation posts cut off, but the artillery
observer inside Sevenig was able to direct the 229th Field Artillery howitzers onto the Germans in the draw. Meanwhile the mortar crews took a hand from their foxholes on the hill behind
Sevenig, dropping mortar shells into the hollows where the Germans congregated or picking them off with carbines.
l Early morning reports of considerable German penetration and the threat to the Our bridges in the 3d Battalion area led the regimental commander to put one of his counterattack plans into
operation. At 0930 two companies of the 2d Battalion (Lt. Col. J. L. MacSalka) assembled in a draw between Ouren and Lieler (west of the river), crossed the bridges the German patrol at
the stone bridge had evaporated under machine gun fire-and moved toward Sevenig. The Germans in the way quickly withdrew to the east. By nightfall the 3d Battalion line on the Sevenig
ridge had been restored while the commander of the 1130th reported that his regiment, despite many attempts, had not been able "to get going."
l The main effort launched by the LVIII Panzer Corps on 16 December was assigned the 116th Panzer Division. This attack aimed at the bridges near Burg Reuland (in the 106th Division
sector) and Oberhausen, in the rear of the positions manned by the left battalion of the 112th. General Waldenburg committed his infantry here, in the predawn hours, hoping that the 60th
Regiment would break through on the right or that the 156th Regiment would reach the river on the left and so secure a bridgehead through which his tank regiment could be passed. The
lay of the ground and defenses in the area north of Lützkampen were such that Waldenburg's right regiment had to move northwestward at an oblique to the axis of his left wing advance.
l In common with the German assault tactics employed all along the front on 16 December, both regiments led off with a predawn advance by shock companies eighty men strong. The
company from the 60th ran into trouble almost immediately when it was immobilized in some woods northwest of Berg by flanking fire from Heckhuscheid, in the 424th Infantry sector.
Later reports indicate that this group was almost wiped out. The assault company from the 156th was initially more fortunate in its advance west of Lützkampen. By 0630 the grenadiers
were behind the command post of the 1st Battalion (Lt. Col. William H. Allen) in Harspelt; the first sign of their presence was a kitchen truck ambushed while journeying to the rear. The
advance party of grenadiers had moved along the wooded draw between the two companies holding the 1st Battalion line.
l When day came the Americans caught the troops following the advance party of the assault company out in the open. Interlocking machine gun and rifle fire blocked off the German
reinforcements some sixty were captured and the rest dug in where they could. Company D, in its support position on the high ground overlooking Lützkampen, meanwhile commenced
mopping up the enemy who had filtered between the companies on the line. By noon Company D had so many prisoners that it "couldn't handle them all!" Nonetheless some part of the
assault wave had broken through as far as the battery positions near Welchenhausen, where they were repelled by the .50-caliber quadruple mounts of the antiaircraft artillery.
l Shortly before noon the advance guard of the 60th Panzer Regiment, rolling along the Lützkampen-Leidenborn road, appeared on the knoll west of Lützkampen. The seven tanks counted
here strangely enough made no effort to attack (perhaps the rough terrain and dragon's teeth along the American bunker line did not appear too promising) . After a brief pause they wheeled
back into Lützkampen. 15 About dark infantry from Lützkampen attacked in close order formation against Company B. Maps picked up from dead Germans showed that the American
machine gun positions had been exactly plotted-but as they had existed up to a change made just before the 16th. The enemy made three attacks in the same close formation over the same
ground before they discovered the error of their ways. Company B, however, had been badly shot up during the engagement and probably somewhat shaken by the presence of two or three
flame-throwing tanks-a new experience to most American troops on the Western Front. Nevertheless by midnight the 1st Battalion front had quieted down, although there still were small
http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Ardennes:_Battle_of_the_Bulge/Chapter_VIII (14 of 24)2/5/2007 10:32:24 PM
This guy was a hero... Led the first successful retailation at the Battle of the Bulge... I dated one of his granddaughters for a few years.
S
Spartacus
Guest
that was volksgrenadiers
nice sounding named units
but old men and boys
mantuefels 5th panzer army reached their Meuse river objectives
creating the so-called bulge
the germans had to employ their old men and boy divisions to hold the breakthrough
their front line troops were at the front
not in the rear shootting up prisoners at malmedy
nice sounding named units
but old men and boys
mantuefels 5th panzer army reached their Meuse river objectives
creating the so-called bulge
the germans had to employ their old men and boy divisions to hold the breakthrough
their front line troops were at the front
not in the rear shootting up prisoners at malmedy
S
Spartacus
Guest
Similar threads
