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what's with all the bombing here last night?
- Thread starter rnch
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patsfan1379
New member
yes. yes we did.
S
Spartacus
Guest
B-29s don't strafe
I told you once before
I told you once before
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Spartacus
Guest
get a P-51 mustang to strafe with
or a P-47 thunderbolt
or a P-47 thunderbolt
S
Spartacus
Guest
javaguru
Banned
I thought you would have posted something like this...Spartacus said:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vPEQt7_3-_s
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Spartacus
Guest
my fav fighter plane is the focke wulfjavaguru said:
can't choose the ME-262 because it's some how unfair
like choosing a ferrari over a production car
duh
so amongst the regular production fighters
I like the FW-190
S
Spartacus
Guest
you'll find this article interestingjavaguru said:
basically germany's armaments production peaked at the same time US strategic bombing peaked
WHAT HAPPENS WHEN an air force loses the ability to gain and maintain air superiority? How might an energetic and resourceful air force leadership deal with this situation? As the United States prepares to face twenty-first-century adversaries, it is extremely unlikely that it will encounter an air force able to match the US Air Force in terms of technology, training, numbers, and combat power. However, the United States may well have to deal with opponents who employ asymmetric strategies in an attempt to wage a "poor man's air war."
A study of the Luftwaffe's efforts to cope with the loss of daylight air superiority in 1944-45 is of more than historical interest. It serves as a case study of how a military organization, faced with neutralization of most of its weaponry and the increasing irrelevance of its doctrine, may attempt to prolong its useful life. Since the United States may encounter such an adversary in the future, an examination of how a past foe coped with this state of affairs may enlighten contemporary air and space planners.
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The Loss of Air Superiority over the Homeland
When the Anglo-American bomber offensive began seriously to threaten Germany's control of its airspace, the Luftwaffe leadership responded energetically. Gen Gunther Korten, chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff, set to the task of creating "an umbrella of fighter aircraft over the Reich." Korten belonged to a "defensive clique" that included Col Adolf Galland--the inspector general of fighters--and Field Marshal Erhard Milch--the chief of air armament. Korten beefed up the homeland air-defense organization, finally creating Air Fleet Reich--equivalent to a numbered air force--which centralized all flak, fighter, and command-and-control functions. At the same time, and in keeping with basic Luftwaffe doctrine, Korten's reforms also called for strong bomber forces in both the eastern and western theaters in order to permit the Luftwaffe to carry out strategic operations. (1) Even so, Korten's program brought about an increase in the strength and efficacy of Germany's air defenses.
Korten's organizational reforms were matched by Milch in fighter production. In partnership with Albert Speer, the armaments minister, Milch minimized the inefficiency of the German aircraft industry. Through stringent measures, he was able to boost aircraft output without increasing consumption of raw materials. (2) By June 1943, German factories were producing over 1,100 fighters per month. In March 1944, Milch and Speer set up a joint "Fighter Staff" with far-reaching authority over production, plant dispersal, construction of bombproof factories, raw material, and labor matters. German aircraft production finally peaked in September 1944 at just over 3,700, despite months of Allied air attacks. (3) The production reflects the underlying tension between the need to strengthen the home-defense forces and the desire to retain an offensive capability. Thus, the Germans also manufactured thousands of bombers (whose production consumed far more raw materials and factory floor space than did fighter aircraft) in 1943-44. (4) The quest for offensive power did its part to make the loss of air superiority permanent.
The Luftwaffe's operational response to the crisis was no less energetic. It placed great hopes in its basic interceptors, the Messerschmitt (Me) Bf 109G and Focke-Wulf Fw 190A. These aircraft initially lacked the necessary armament to deal with American heavy bombers, so later variants carried 13 mm machine guns and 30 mm cannons in place of the earlier 7.9 mm and 20 mm weaponry. Both types could also carry 21 cm rocket mortars to break up enemy bomber formations from well outside the radius of their defensive fire-power. The German fighters would then pick off the stragglers at will.
Yet, these modifications also hastened the loss of air superiority once American long-range escort fighters appeared on the scene. The heavily laden 109s and 190s were severely handicapped in combat with their less encumbered American adversaries--a problem the Luftwaffe command never solved. One attempted remedy involved the development of specially stripped fighter aircraft with superior high-altitude performance and air-to-air capability. These included Bf 109G and K fighters with special superchargers and methanol and nitrous oxide injection, as well as the "long-nosed" Fw 190D and Ta 152. These vastly improved interceptors appeared only in small numbers; coordinating the "light" and "heavy" aircraft proved extremely difficult--and tactically ineffective--in practice.
more...
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0NXL/is_4_17/ai_113563544
javaguru
Banned
First and Second Schweinfurt raids are the textbooks examples used for arguing the costliness and relative ineffectiveness of the strategic bombing campaign. Had the allies concentrated their efforts more on the oil facilities the impact would have been much greater.
"Schweinfurt was the location of most of the ball-bearing production in Nazi Germany at the onset of World War II, and was eventually devastated following a series of Allied strategic bombing raids. It was hoped that the destruction of the factories located in the city would cripple the production of new tanks and aircraft.
Two of these raids were particularly costly for the United States Army Air Forces. On August 17, 1943, 230 B-17s of the USAAF 8th Air Force, intended as the second wave of bombers behind a force attacking Regensburg (see Schweinfurt-Regensburg mission, encountered intense anti-aircraft artillery and over 300 defending fighter aircraft, with the result that only 184 aircraft bombed their targets and 36 aircraft did not return to their bases in England. Production suffered an immediate 34% cutback, and all plants but the largest were devastated by fire, but the existing industrial infrastructure had not been conducive to destruction by a single raid. Efforts to disperse the surviving machinery began immediately and the Luftwaffe, recognizing the threat, began redeploying large numbers of interceptors along the corridor to Schweinfurt.[1]
After rebuilding its strength the 8th Air Force mounted a second attack on October 14, 1943, which proved to be more costly than the first and became known as "Black Thursday" (see Second Raid on Schweinfurt). In this raid by 291 B-17s, 229 bombed the target and 60 were lost. Such very heavy losses could not be sustained, and unescorted bomber raids deep into Germany were suspended until 1944. Raids on Schweinfurt resumed in February, 1944 during what came to be known as "Big Week."
Although losses of production bearings and machinery were high, and much of the industrial and residential areas of the city were destroyed, killing more than a thousand civilians, the factories were restored to production and the industry dispersed. Although German planners initially thought it essential to purchase the entire output of the Swedish ball-bearing industry, losses in production bearings were actually made up from surpluses found within Germany in the aftermath of the first raid.
The Allies, according to Albert Speer, were remiss in mounting a decisive bombing campaign against the bearing industry while it was still centrally located. Once de-centralized, the Nazis were able to rebuild output to 85% of its pre-bombing output. Hitler made restoration of ball-bearing production a high priority, and massive efforts were undertaken to repair and rebuild the factories partially in bomb-proof underground facilities
U.S. bombers flying through flak over Schweinfurt.Schweinfurt was bombed 22 times by the USAAF and RAF, by a total of 2285 aircraft, until it was captured by the 42nd Infantry Division in house-to-house fighting in April 1945."
"Schweinfurt was the location of most of the ball-bearing production in Nazi Germany at the onset of World War II, and was eventually devastated following a series of Allied strategic bombing raids. It was hoped that the destruction of the factories located in the city would cripple the production of new tanks and aircraft.
Two of these raids were particularly costly for the United States Army Air Forces. On August 17, 1943, 230 B-17s of the USAAF 8th Air Force, intended as the second wave of bombers behind a force attacking Regensburg (see Schweinfurt-Regensburg mission, encountered intense anti-aircraft artillery and over 300 defending fighter aircraft, with the result that only 184 aircraft bombed their targets and 36 aircraft did not return to their bases in England. Production suffered an immediate 34% cutback, and all plants but the largest were devastated by fire, but the existing industrial infrastructure had not been conducive to destruction by a single raid. Efforts to disperse the surviving machinery began immediately and the Luftwaffe, recognizing the threat, began redeploying large numbers of interceptors along the corridor to Schweinfurt.[1]
After rebuilding its strength the 8th Air Force mounted a second attack on October 14, 1943, which proved to be more costly than the first and became known as "Black Thursday" (see Second Raid on Schweinfurt). In this raid by 291 B-17s, 229 bombed the target and 60 were lost. Such very heavy losses could not be sustained, and unescorted bomber raids deep into Germany were suspended until 1944. Raids on Schweinfurt resumed in February, 1944 during what came to be known as "Big Week."
Although losses of production bearings and machinery were high, and much of the industrial and residential areas of the city were destroyed, killing more than a thousand civilians, the factories were restored to production and the industry dispersed. Although German planners initially thought it essential to purchase the entire output of the Swedish ball-bearing industry, losses in production bearings were actually made up from surpluses found within Germany in the aftermath of the first raid.
The Allies, according to Albert Speer, were remiss in mounting a decisive bombing campaign against the bearing industry while it was still centrally located. Once de-centralized, the Nazis were able to rebuild output to 85% of its pre-bombing output. Hitler made restoration of ball-bearing production a high priority, and massive efforts were undertaken to repair and rebuild the factories partially in bomb-proof underground facilities
U.S. bombers flying through flak over Schweinfurt.Schweinfurt was bombed 22 times by the USAAF and RAF, by a total of 2285 aircraft, until it was captured by the 42nd Infantry Division in house-to-house fighting in April 1945."
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Spartacus
Guest
concerning strafing;
In April and May 1944, the operations staff noted an alarming rise in losses of training, courier, and transport aircraft operating in previously safe havens in eastern and southern Germany. (16) Allied fighter aircraft ranging at will over Reich territory curtailed the Luftwaffe's ability to train new pilots to replace losses of the previous months. Many gun-camera films from AAF Mustangs and Thunderbolts illustrate attacks on aircraft, frequently misidentified as "Me-109s," that are in fact Arado 96 trainers--usually with a dazed student pilot at the controls. In order to cope with this situation, the Training Branch issued new instructions emphasizing vigilance ("day-dreaming leads to death"). Noncombat flights were to take place only at dawn and dusk. The Luftwaffe expanded its aircraft-warning system and devised a series of radio and visual signals. Even courier aircraft were armed. If attacked, aircraft were to take evasive action and dive quickly to ground level. If necessary, the crew was to belly-land the aircraft and take cover to avoid being strafed. (17)
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The commencement of "aerial guerrilla warfare" by AAF escort fighters meant that not only the training facilities, but also the whole of the Luftwaffe's supporting infrastructure was at risk. American escort fighters, at first individually but later as a concerted policy, began strafing airfields and ground installations on their homeward flights. (18) The Luftwaffe airfield commands adopted a number of passive measures, including constructing revetments, increasing the use of optical camouflage and smoke screens, and burying vital communications and electrical cables that served command posts and radar installations. (19) Deep slit trenches appeared on airfields, with fuel and ammunition stored in tunnels. Posting of additional lookouts and a reorganization of the aircraft-reporting service provided crucial early warning. (20) In the final month of the war, some units operated off stretches of the autobahn, sheltering their aircraft beneath the overpasses.
The single most effective countermeasure the Luftwaffe took was the equipping of airfields with additional antiaircraft protection. Luftwaffe operational directives pointed out that the concentrated firing of every available weapon--even machine guns and cannons removed from parked aircraft--could turn the airfield into a veritable "flak trap" for low-flying aircraft. The Luftwaffe operations staff noted with satisfaction the depositions of captured AAF pilots who spoke of the dangers of strafing. (21) Indeed, during 1944 the AAF lost 1,293 fighters in the European theater of operations to enemy fighters, while losing 1,611 to flak--mostly in low-level actions. (22) During the last five months of the war, German flak kills of AAF fighters exceeded those made by Luftwaffe fighters by a ratio of nearly four to one.
In April and May 1944, the operations staff noted an alarming rise in losses of training, courier, and transport aircraft operating in previously safe havens in eastern and southern Germany. (16) Allied fighter aircraft ranging at will over Reich territory curtailed the Luftwaffe's ability to train new pilots to replace losses of the previous months. Many gun-camera films from AAF Mustangs and Thunderbolts illustrate attacks on aircraft, frequently misidentified as "Me-109s," that are in fact Arado 96 trainers--usually with a dazed student pilot at the controls. In order to cope with this situation, the Training Branch issued new instructions emphasizing vigilance ("day-dreaming leads to death"). Noncombat flights were to take place only at dawn and dusk. The Luftwaffe expanded its aircraft-warning system and devised a series of radio and visual signals. Even courier aircraft were armed. If attacked, aircraft were to take evasive action and dive quickly to ground level. If necessary, the crew was to belly-land the aircraft and take cover to avoid being strafed. (17)
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The commencement of "aerial guerrilla warfare" by AAF escort fighters meant that not only the training facilities, but also the whole of the Luftwaffe's supporting infrastructure was at risk. American escort fighters, at first individually but later as a concerted policy, began strafing airfields and ground installations on their homeward flights. (18) The Luftwaffe airfield commands adopted a number of passive measures, including constructing revetments, increasing the use of optical camouflage and smoke screens, and burying vital communications and electrical cables that served command posts and radar installations. (19) Deep slit trenches appeared on airfields, with fuel and ammunition stored in tunnels. Posting of additional lookouts and a reorganization of the aircraft-reporting service provided crucial early warning. (20) In the final month of the war, some units operated off stretches of the autobahn, sheltering their aircraft beneath the overpasses.
The single most effective countermeasure the Luftwaffe took was the equipping of airfields with additional antiaircraft protection. Luftwaffe operational directives pointed out that the concentrated firing of every available weapon--even machine guns and cannons removed from parked aircraft--could turn the airfield into a veritable "flak trap" for low-flying aircraft. The Luftwaffe operations staff noted with satisfaction the depositions of captured AAF pilots who spoke of the dangers of strafing. (21) Indeed, during 1944 the AAF lost 1,293 fighters in the European theater of operations to enemy fighters, while losing 1,611 to flak--mostly in low-level actions. (22) During the last five months of the war, German flak kills of AAF fighters exceeded those made by Luftwaffe fighters by a ratio of nearly four to one.
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Spartacus
Guest
it's also been argued that destroying the german cities destroyed the regular jobs for the civiliansjavaguru said:
so they all started working in the armaments industry
which Albert Speer,who I've admired since about age 13, had relocated and dispersed and moved underground
we were bombing the wrong shit for about 80% of the campaign
it wasn't until some bright light suggested concentrating on the petro did it become effective
and the war was over by then
basically a bunch of waste was the strategic bombing campaign
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Spartacus
Guest
incidentally
the origin of the use of "flak" in american lingo
i.e. "I caught a lot of flak from that asshole"
is from the german term
fleiger abwehr kanone
anti-aircraft gun
the origin of the use of "flak" in american lingo
i.e. "I caught a lot of flak from that asshole"
is from the german term
fleiger abwehr kanone
anti-aircraft gun
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Spartacus
Guest
I would think that's because the japs had the USN to worry about mostjavaguru said:
the germans greatest concern was the russians obviously
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