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Watch out for Turkey
G2 Bulletin
22.03.2003
The 189-kilometer-long Turkish-Iraqi border stretches through a mainly mountainous terrain where a number of ethnic minorities reside.
The most predominant group is the Kurds, but there are others, such as the Turkemans and the Nestorian Christians. This ethnically colorful border is relatively short in comparison with the 550-kilometer Iraqi-Saudi border and the 812-kilometer-long border with Iran. Iraq also borders Jordan along 90 kilometers and Kuwait with 158 kilometers.
It is not just the ethnic diversity that makes this border interesting in times of regional confrontations. The border is more important to Iraq than to Turkey, as this is Iraq's main land link to Europe. It is vital because of the border's overall economic aspects – critical to Iraqi imports and exports through Turkish Mediterranean ports. It allows shipments of Iraqi oil through the Kirkuk-Alexandreta pipeline and enables Iraq, at times, to bypass Syria, which is a difficult neighbor, due to the two different concepts of the ruling Baath Party legacy.
Turkey's military, which for years has been cooperating with Iraq on many issues, included military and intelligence exchanges, was mainly concerned with fighting Kurdish uprisings. The military history of the two nations goes back to the Cold War era, when, in 1955, the Baghdad Pact was signed between Turkey and Iraq, following an earlier Turkish-Pakistani military agreement signed in 1954. The UK, Iran and Pakistan later joined the Baghdad Pact, which became both a framework for economic cooperation and a military arrangement to curb the Soviets move into the Near East. The U.S., which was behind the creation of the pact, later to be known as the Central Alliance Treaty, remained in the role of financier, adviser and political supporter.
The collapse of the alliance followed the 1958 Iraqi revolution, and later, due to changes in Pakistan, the alliance ended. This did not mean that Turkish cooperation with Iraq stopped. The bilateral interests of the two countries created areas of cooperation, such as the control of the Euphrates River, a 3000-kilometer major waterway originating in Turkey and flowing through Syria into Iraq. The Turks like to portray themselves as the water faucet of Iraq and Syria – as they control the water level running through Baghdad.
Another area of cooperation has been economic, including arms trades. Turkey sold Iraq ammunition and light weapons. The countries also shared intelligence information in two major areas of common interest – the "Kurdish dilemma" and Iran. These issues were perceived by the Turks and the Iraqis as a constant threat to their national security. The Turkish military and intelligence ties with Iraq blossomed during the eight years of the Iraqi-Iranian war of 1980-1988. On various occasions, the U.S. was friendly to the Baghdad regime under the concept of "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." But, even though the U.S. terminated its support of Iraq, Turkey continued to improve connections, and in a region where political "ups and downs" are common phenomena, the Turks maintained a more or less normal relationship with its neighbor to the south.
The situation began to deteriorate in the wake of the first Gulf War and the Northern Watch Operation, when Kurdish organizations started to build an independent Kurdistan as an enclave in northern Iraq. The Turks were confronted by a flood of tens of thousands of refugees who crossed the border to the north, and at the time they needed the support of the U.S. and other countries, as well as the international relief bodies, to deal with the refugees.
Turkey has a military presence in northern Iraq, and last Wednesday the General Staff said that "equipment would be sent to the region under the control of the second army command." As early as Jan. 29, the Turkish press quoted military officials as saying: "We have to make our units in the region prepared beforehand for possible developments. To this end, we will start to send equipment and materials to the region starting today."
During the long, tiring weeks of Secretary of State Colin Powell's futile negotiations with Turkey over the American request to increase presence of U.S. troops on Turkish soil as well as OK overflights, it became clear that, in the eyes of Turkey, the real issue of refugees and the "Kurdish Dilemma" remain on the front burner for Ankara.
"From our point of view, the first Gulf War has never ended," a Turkish senior officer told G2B. The officer explained that for 12 years Turkey has had to handle the refugee problem and has been forced to keep a high standard of readiness of its armed forces in the region. This situation of readiness nearly led several times to Turkish interventions in northern Iraq, especially when the Saddam regime acted against the Kurdish enclave.
"Even in the mid-'90s, we restrained our reaction to events in Iraq, believing that in any case we will be an active member in any coalition led by the U.S., a situation which will legitimize our invasion of northern Iraq," said the officer. He went on to explain that the decision not to allow American troops to deploy and to operate from Turkey "was a great disappointment to the armed forces, which has plans for taking northern Iraq." It is obvious that the Turkish military was angry at Parliament, which voted with a slim majority against participation in the U.S. coalition. G2B was told the common talk in the officer's club in Ankara was around the expectation that the Turkish army would move south shortly after the first shots of the second Gulf War would be fired.
Meanwhile, as the military's pressure on new Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan intensified, there were signs that U.S. troops were active in the military port of Iskanderun, unloading vehicles and equipment. The Turks reported that one U.S. soldier was injured during this operation, and that U.S. army advance teams inspected railway stations and lines, as well as roads and bridges leading to the border. One of the stations visited by a 10-member U.S. military delegation is in the town of Nusaybin in the southern province of Mardin. The Turkish government also announced that a press center was opened in the Dedeman Hotel in Diyarbakir. Foreign journalists were told they would be able to work also in other southern districts, such as the Van and Hakkari provinces.
This situation, which kept thousands of American troops waiting to be deployed, changed shortly before the outbreak of hostilities.
Turkey refused to allow a decisive U.S. military presence and has been tilting back and forth over the issue of overflights. The military was quick to adapt to the new situation, changing its strategy from a coalition-type operation to a possible anti-Kurdish campaign.
Analysts and intelligence officers believe the government in Ankara will not be able to stand idle and eventually will be persuaded by the military to use the opportunity to crush Kurdish signs of independence in northern Iraq. They are concerned about the future of a number of oil fields claimed by the Kurds, mainly in the Mosul-Irbil-Kirkuk area.
An Israeli analyst close to the Turkish army said, "The Turkish military doesn't give a damn over the question of who will rule Baghdad, but they will take a stand over the issue of who will rule Kirkuk, Mosul and Irbil."
The expert stressed the Turkish military are, in their own eyes, the guardians of the Ataturk legacy and the sponsors of national missions. It was this legacy that led to three military coups since 1960. In Turkey, it is the military, and not the government nor Parliament, that is the ultimate power broker. It is up to the military to decide if and when to move toward Iraqi Kurdistan.
Kurdish officials, closely monitoring the latest developments, stress their concern about the lack of U.S. troops on the northern Iraqi front. They fear that, without American presence, they will be exposed to the might of the Turkish army.
"At this point, we are more concerned with Turkey than with Saddam Hussein," wrote a Kurdish intellectual to his friends in Canada. The Kurds had hoped the landing of American troops in Turkish ports, and especially in Iskanderun on the Mediterranean, would allow American forces to roll quickly to the region of Dohuk and along the roads leading from Mosul to Kirkuk. Thousands of Kurds left the area and moved north fearing a chemical or biological Iraqi reprisal.
The Kurds also expected the U.S. to use as an avenue of approach the main roads and valley passages leading from the mountainous terrain to the open plains going to Tikrit and Baghdad.
A Defense Intelligence Agency official remarked on the same issue from a different point of view, saying, "It may be smart not to have too many of our troops there, because we could become unwilling partners to what the Turks might do to the Kurds." On the other hand, the same analyst said the U.S. has to keep open channels of communications and good relationships with the Kurds, especially for "the day after."
Analyzing the Turkish military shows there is no doubt Turkey could be an important asset to the coalition. The Turkish land forces are among the largest in NATO. They include the following formations:
4 field armies
10 army corps
2 mechanized infantry divisions
2 mechanized infantry divisions HQs (Tactical)
1 infantry division and 1 training division
14 mechanized infantry brigades
14 armored brigades
12 infantry/regional sec. brigades
5 command brigades
5 training brigades
Add to this the powerful, battle-trained gendarmerie, the amphibious brigade and the strength of the naval forces and air force combined, and you have a force by far larger than the total American deployment in the region.
Turkish Chief of Staff General Hilmi Ozkok is well aware of his army's might. He has made it clear to the new Prime Minister that the army is not going to sit idle. The numbers are significant. The U.S. might need additional combat troops to be brought in quickly and a large military force to take over the pacification of Iraq after the war.
A Pentagon official, talking to G2B, said, "It is hard to imagine that we will keep 350,000 men and women tied down in Iraq at a time when our forces are thinly spread around the globe and may need to intervene, or take up defense duties elsewhere."
The Turkish army is well-trained, well-equipped and highly motivated. U.S. military historian Gen. S.L.A. Marshal praised Turkish troops fighting in the Korean War as an exemplary infantry. The Turkish military has a tradition of cooperating with the U.S. Those relationships continued over the years through NATO, even at times of crisis, such as during the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus and a number of confrontations with Greece. The Turkish infantry is among the best trained in mountain warfare, and what's more, according to a British officer speaking in Cyprus, "the presence of Turkish infantry could be highly important should the war include urban combats in and around Baghdad." The officer also stressed the fact that many Turkish troops speak the languages of northern Iraq and are well familiar with the ethnic diversity there. Other analysts pointed out three major points in favor of Turkish participation in the coalition:
The presence of a large Turkish field army north of the border, or across it, will force the Iraqi General Staff to prepare for a campaign and to allocate forces to protect approaches to Baghdad from the north;
The initial expectation was that the U.S. Air Force would continue to operate out of Turkish bases even without direct Turkish air force involvement; and
Turkey has the only available manpower resource in the region, and if it decides to participate in the coalition, it will provide a major reservoir of large, effective army formations.
In the Turkish General Staff, there is a strong belief the U.S. alone can indeed "finish the job," even at the head of a limited coalition. Turkish generals see as a gross distortion the depiction of the Iraqi army in terms bigger than life. They believe that American firepower can bring about a swift, decisive victory that will cause a quick collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime. The generals hope this will happen sooner rather than later. They believe if they participate, their infantry and special forces will help prevent the creation of a Baghdadograd strategy by Hussein.
The Turkish General Staff is prepared to deploy the second field army in northern Iraq. But it dreams of reaching "historic targets" torn away from Turkey by the winning powers of World War I. These include areas rich in minerals and oil.
Many in the Turkish General Staff believe the moment of cooperation with the coalition will eventually come. They hope, if U.S. policy is to dismantle the present Iraq and a turn it into a federation of regions, Turkey will get her share by way of influence.
"We are partners who at this moment have one foot across the barbed wire, ready to fully move into Iraq," said one Turkish general. "You will need us, whether during the battles or after the end of hostilities."
He finished his words by saying: "We are there. We are a regional reality, and nothing is going to change that."
Watch out for Turkey
G2 Bulletin
22.03.2003
The 189-kilometer-long Turkish-Iraqi border stretches through a mainly mountainous terrain where a number of ethnic minorities reside.
The most predominant group is the Kurds, but there are others, such as the Turkemans and the Nestorian Christians. This ethnically colorful border is relatively short in comparison with the 550-kilometer Iraqi-Saudi border and the 812-kilometer-long border with Iran. Iraq also borders Jordan along 90 kilometers and Kuwait with 158 kilometers.
It is not just the ethnic diversity that makes this border interesting in times of regional confrontations. The border is more important to Iraq than to Turkey, as this is Iraq's main land link to Europe. It is vital because of the border's overall economic aspects – critical to Iraqi imports and exports through Turkish Mediterranean ports. It allows shipments of Iraqi oil through the Kirkuk-Alexandreta pipeline and enables Iraq, at times, to bypass Syria, which is a difficult neighbor, due to the two different concepts of the ruling Baath Party legacy.
Turkey's military, which for years has been cooperating with Iraq on many issues, included military and intelligence exchanges, was mainly concerned with fighting Kurdish uprisings. The military history of the two nations goes back to the Cold War era, when, in 1955, the Baghdad Pact was signed between Turkey and Iraq, following an earlier Turkish-Pakistani military agreement signed in 1954. The UK, Iran and Pakistan later joined the Baghdad Pact, which became both a framework for economic cooperation and a military arrangement to curb the Soviets move into the Near East. The U.S., which was behind the creation of the pact, later to be known as the Central Alliance Treaty, remained in the role of financier, adviser and political supporter.
The collapse of the alliance followed the 1958 Iraqi revolution, and later, due to changes in Pakistan, the alliance ended. This did not mean that Turkish cooperation with Iraq stopped. The bilateral interests of the two countries created areas of cooperation, such as the control of the Euphrates River, a 3000-kilometer major waterway originating in Turkey and flowing through Syria into Iraq. The Turks like to portray themselves as the water faucet of Iraq and Syria – as they control the water level running through Baghdad.
Another area of cooperation has been economic, including arms trades. Turkey sold Iraq ammunition and light weapons. The countries also shared intelligence information in two major areas of common interest – the "Kurdish dilemma" and Iran. These issues were perceived by the Turks and the Iraqis as a constant threat to their national security. The Turkish military and intelligence ties with Iraq blossomed during the eight years of the Iraqi-Iranian war of 1980-1988. On various occasions, the U.S. was friendly to the Baghdad regime under the concept of "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." But, even though the U.S. terminated its support of Iraq, Turkey continued to improve connections, and in a region where political "ups and downs" are common phenomena, the Turks maintained a more or less normal relationship with its neighbor to the south.
The situation began to deteriorate in the wake of the first Gulf War and the Northern Watch Operation, when Kurdish organizations started to build an independent Kurdistan as an enclave in northern Iraq. The Turks were confronted by a flood of tens of thousands of refugees who crossed the border to the north, and at the time they needed the support of the U.S. and other countries, as well as the international relief bodies, to deal with the refugees.
Turkey has a military presence in northern Iraq, and last Wednesday the General Staff said that "equipment would be sent to the region under the control of the second army command." As early as Jan. 29, the Turkish press quoted military officials as saying: "We have to make our units in the region prepared beforehand for possible developments. To this end, we will start to send equipment and materials to the region starting today."
During the long, tiring weeks of Secretary of State Colin Powell's futile negotiations with Turkey over the American request to increase presence of U.S. troops on Turkish soil as well as OK overflights, it became clear that, in the eyes of Turkey, the real issue of refugees and the "Kurdish Dilemma" remain on the front burner for Ankara.
"From our point of view, the first Gulf War has never ended," a Turkish senior officer told G2B. The officer explained that for 12 years Turkey has had to handle the refugee problem and has been forced to keep a high standard of readiness of its armed forces in the region. This situation of readiness nearly led several times to Turkish interventions in northern Iraq, especially when the Saddam regime acted against the Kurdish enclave.
"Even in the mid-'90s, we restrained our reaction to events in Iraq, believing that in any case we will be an active member in any coalition led by the U.S., a situation which will legitimize our invasion of northern Iraq," said the officer. He went on to explain that the decision not to allow American troops to deploy and to operate from Turkey "was a great disappointment to the armed forces, which has plans for taking northern Iraq." It is obvious that the Turkish military was angry at Parliament, which voted with a slim majority against participation in the U.S. coalition. G2B was told the common talk in the officer's club in Ankara was around the expectation that the Turkish army would move south shortly after the first shots of the second Gulf War would be fired.
Meanwhile, as the military's pressure on new Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan intensified, there were signs that U.S. troops were active in the military port of Iskanderun, unloading vehicles and equipment. The Turks reported that one U.S. soldier was injured during this operation, and that U.S. army advance teams inspected railway stations and lines, as well as roads and bridges leading to the border. One of the stations visited by a 10-member U.S. military delegation is in the town of Nusaybin in the southern province of Mardin. The Turkish government also announced that a press center was opened in the Dedeman Hotel in Diyarbakir. Foreign journalists were told they would be able to work also in other southern districts, such as the Van and Hakkari provinces.
This situation, which kept thousands of American troops waiting to be deployed, changed shortly before the outbreak of hostilities.
Turkey refused to allow a decisive U.S. military presence and has been tilting back and forth over the issue of overflights. The military was quick to adapt to the new situation, changing its strategy from a coalition-type operation to a possible anti-Kurdish campaign.
Analysts and intelligence officers believe the government in Ankara will not be able to stand idle and eventually will be persuaded by the military to use the opportunity to crush Kurdish signs of independence in northern Iraq. They are concerned about the future of a number of oil fields claimed by the Kurds, mainly in the Mosul-Irbil-Kirkuk area.
An Israeli analyst close to the Turkish army said, "The Turkish military doesn't give a damn over the question of who will rule Baghdad, but they will take a stand over the issue of who will rule Kirkuk, Mosul and Irbil."
The expert stressed the Turkish military are, in their own eyes, the guardians of the Ataturk legacy and the sponsors of national missions. It was this legacy that led to three military coups since 1960. In Turkey, it is the military, and not the government nor Parliament, that is the ultimate power broker. It is up to the military to decide if and when to move toward Iraqi Kurdistan.
Kurdish officials, closely monitoring the latest developments, stress their concern about the lack of U.S. troops on the northern Iraqi front. They fear that, without American presence, they will be exposed to the might of the Turkish army.
"At this point, we are more concerned with Turkey than with Saddam Hussein," wrote a Kurdish intellectual to his friends in Canada. The Kurds had hoped the landing of American troops in Turkish ports, and especially in Iskanderun on the Mediterranean, would allow American forces to roll quickly to the region of Dohuk and along the roads leading from Mosul to Kirkuk. Thousands of Kurds left the area and moved north fearing a chemical or biological Iraqi reprisal.
The Kurds also expected the U.S. to use as an avenue of approach the main roads and valley passages leading from the mountainous terrain to the open plains going to Tikrit and Baghdad.
A Defense Intelligence Agency official remarked on the same issue from a different point of view, saying, "It may be smart not to have too many of our troops there, because we could become unwilling partners to what the Turks might do to the Kurds." On the other hand, the same analyst said the U.S. has to keep open channels of communications and good relationships with the Kurds, especially for "the day after."
Analyzing the Turkish military shows there is no doubt Turkey could be an important asset to the coalition. The Turkish land forces are among the largest in NATO. They include the following formations:
4 field armies
10 army corps
2 mechanized infantry divisions
2 mechanized infantry divisions HQs (Tactical)
1 infantry division and 1 training division
14 mechanized infantry brigades
14 armored brigades
12 infantry/regional sec. brigades
5 command brigades
5 training brigades
Add to this the powerful, battle-trained gendarmerie, the amphibious brigade and the strength of the naval forces and air force combined, and you have a force by far larger than the total American deployment in the region.
Turkish Chief of Staff General Hilmi Ozkok is well aware of his army's might. He has made it clear to the new Prime Minister that the army is not going to sit idle. The numbers are significant. The U.S. might need additional combat troops to be brought in quickly and a large military force to take over the pacification of Iraq after the war.
A Pentagon official, talking to G2B, said, "It is hard to imagine that we will keep 350,000 men and women tied down in Iraq at a time when our forces are thinly spread around the globe and may need to intervene, or take up defense duties elsewhere."
The Turkish army is well-trained, well-equipped and highly motivated. U.S. military historian Gen. S.L.A. Marshal praised Turkish troops fighting in the Korean War as an exemplary infantry. The Turkish military has a tradition of cooperating with the U.S. Those relationships continued over the years through NATO, even at times of crisis, such as during the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus and a number of confrontations with Greece. The Turkish infantry is among the best trained in mountain warfare, and what's more, according to a British officer speaking in Cyprus, "the presence of Turkish infantry could be highly important should the war include urban combats in and around Baghdad." The officer also stressed the fact that many Turkish troops speak the languages of northern Iraq and are well familiar with the ethnic diversity there. Other analysts pointed out three major points in favor of Turkish participation in the coalition:
The presence of a large Turkish field army north of the border, or across it, will force the Iraqi General Staff to prepare for a campaign and to allocate forces to protect approaches to Baghdad from the north;
The initial expectation was that the U.S. Air Force would continue to operate out of Turkish bases even without direct Turkish air force involvement; and
Turkey has the only available manpower resource in the region, and if it decides to participate in the coalition, it will provide a major reservoir of large, effective army formations.
In the Turkish General Staff, there is a strong belief the U.S. alone can indeed "finish the job," even at the head of a limited coalition. Turkish generals see as a gross distortion the depiction of the Iraqi army in terms bigger than life. They believe that American firepower can bring about a swift, decisive victory that will cause a quick collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime. The generals hope this will happen sooner rather than later. They believe if they participate, their infantry and special forces will help prevent the creation of a Baghdadograd strategy by Hussein.
The Turkish General Staff is prepared to deploy the second field army in northern Iraq. But it dreams of reaching "historic targets" torn away from Turkey by the winning powers of World War I. These include areas rich in minerals and oil.
Many in the Turkish General Staff believe the moment of cooperation with the coalition will eventually come. They hope, if U.S. policy is to dismantle the present Iraq and a turn it into a federation of regions, Turkey will get her share by way of influence.
"We are partners who at this moment have one foot across the barbed wire, ready to fully move into Iraq," said one Turkish general. "You will need us, whether during the battles or after the end of hostilities."
He finished his words by saying: "We are there. We are a regional reality, and nothing is going to change that."
