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Tuesday, August 29, 2006. Issue 3485. Page 1.
Rumsfeld Makes Case for Converting Missiles
Combined Reports
Al Grillo / AP
Rumsfeld, third from right, and Ivanov, right, joining other dignitaries in cutting a ribbon dedicating a World War II memorial Sunday in Fairbanks, Alaska.
FAIRBANKS, Alaska -- Flanked by Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld made his strongest public case yet for a Russian-opposed plan to convert long-range missiles from a nuclear to a conventional role for use against terrorist targets anywhere in the world.
Opponents of the plan argue that it could create a situation in which a conventionally armed U.S. Trident missile, launched from a submarine, would be mistaken for a nuclear launch, thus risking the possibility of a retaliatory nuclear strike.
Rumsfeld said he thought little of that argument.
He told reporters at a news conference with Ivanov in Alaska that the Pentagon would be "fully transparent" with Moscow about any such conversion of strategic missiles, so that there would be no room for miscalculation.
"There are only a few countries that would have the ability to do anything about it -- regardless of which type of weapon it was," he said Sunday, alluding to the small number of countries, such as Russia, China and possibly North Korea, that possess nuclear missiles capable of reaching U.S. territory.
Besides, he added, "everyone in the world would know" that the U.S. missile was not nuclear "after it hit within 30 minutes" of launch.
"Or 10 minutes," Ivanov interjected.
By noting that a long-range missile might hit its target in as little as 10 minutes after launch, Ivanov appeared to be emphasizing the short time frame in which a decision on retaliating would have to be made.
At an otherwise harmonious news conference, Rumsfeld explained the U.S. rationale for the plan to put conventional warheads on some Trident missiles aboard submarines, and said Moscow should embrace the idea for its own good.
"It would be a good thing if, five, 10 or 15 years from now both of our countries had that additional weapon available in case it might be needed in an unusual circumstance," Rumsfeld said in response to a question from a Russian reporter who asked him to comment on reports about the conversion plan.
"We would be happy to see the Russian government decide to do the same thing," he said.
Later he said, "I hope my friend Sergei takes that home and discusses it and calls me up on the phone and says he thinks that's a terrific idea."
Ivanov, however, made clear that Moscow opposed the plan.
"I would like to stress this point: These are preliminary plans, and for sure these U.S. plans raise Russian concerns," Ivanov said.
He said he understood that Rumsfeld saw this prospective weapon as a way of maximizing U.S. options for "preventive strikes," meaning attacks against terrorist targets that are launched not in response to a terrorist act, but to destroy a terrorist weapon before it can be used.
"There are different solutions" to that problem, Ivanov said. He mentioned the use of cruise missiles, which traditionally carry conventional warheads and would not be mistaken for a nuclear strike.
Ivanov said Moscow was willing to discuss the matter with U.S. officials.
He also said Moscow and Washington were negotiating an accord on cooperation in the sphere of defense technologies and another one on protection of information about each other's space activities.
"Not everything is that simple. There are certain contradictions, but we know how to advance further," Ivanov said of the defense technologies accord, Interfax reported.
Ivanov gave no details on either accord, and calls to the press services of the Defense Ministry and Federal Space Agency went unanswered Monday.
Russia and the United States have previously signed so-called safeguard accords that oblige the Russian side to prevent technology leaks during launches of U.S.-made satellites by Russian rockets.
Earlier Sunday, Rumsfeld and Ivanov held talks at a Fairbanks lodge, ate lunch together and attended a ceremony dedicating a memorial to U.S.-Soviet military cooperation in World War II.
The two defense chiefs also discussed Russia's objections to economic sanctions imposed earlier this month by the U.S. State Department on two Russian arms companies for their dealings with Iran. The companies -- Rosoboronexport and Sukhoi -- were among seven companies that Washington said violated a U.S. law known as the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000. The law is aimed at preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction to Tehran.
Rumsfeld said Moscow and Washington disagreed over the facts in the case and that he agreed the matter should be reconsidered.
Russia's opposition to Rumsfeld's idea of converting submarine-launched ballistic missiles to carry conventional payloads is a negotiating position rather than a reflection of genuine concern, said Alexander Khramchikhin, an analyst with the Moscow-based Institute of Military and Political Analysis.
Khramchikhin said Russia's early-warning system personnel could easily tell a premeditated U.S. nuclear attack on Russia from an attack on a terrorist target by counting the number of bleeps on the screens of their early-warning system. A nuclear strike on Russia would feature the simultaneous launch of hundreds of ballistic missiles that would inflict huge damage and decapitate Russia's capabilities for a response strike, while an attack on a terrorist target would require a far smaller number of missiles.
Khramchikhin also said he doubted Russia could modify its own intercontinental ballistic missiles for conventional use, not only because Russia needed to keep an arsenal of such missiles to maintain some semblance of strategic parity with the United States, but also because those missiles lack the precision needed to ensure the destruction of a target by conventional warheads.
Kevin Ryan, a retired general and senior fellow at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, said he believed both the United States and Russia needed the option of placing conventional warheads in ballistic missiles. "Eventually, other non-nuclear nations will have long-range missiles, and we should have the capability to react without going nuclear, " he said.
But Russia's concerns are legitimate, too, Ryan said.
"If you are developing a surprise capability, it seems reasonable to ask how that can be rectified with a promise to let a third party like Russia (and perhaps others in the future) know what you are doing," Ryan said by e-mail.
He said some of Russia's concerns could be alleviated if both sides renewed work on the establishment of a joint data and early-warning center in Moscow. Another step could be for the United States and Russia to agree "no first use" of nuclear weapons, he said.
(AP, MT)
