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Citruscide
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I took these straight from my criminal procedure notes from law school... before every class, I read up on the cases, and typed, and printed the notes. It was always cool to ALWAYS have the answer for the teacher... needless to say... with all the prep, I got an A... but enough self-tooting. 
• Schneckloth v. Bustamonte: Nature of Consent
• Facts: Bustamonte (D) and five others were in a car with a burned-out headlight. Police stopped the car; the driver had no license. A passenger, Alcala, had a license and told police the car was his brother’s. Police asked if they could search the car; Alcala said yes and opened the trunk, where police found stolen checks. D was convicted of theft and appeals.
• Issue: In order for a defendant’s consent to be voluntary, must he be warned that he is under no obligation to give his consent?
• Held: No. Conviction sustained.
• (a). The Court held that the consent was voluntary (i.e., not the result of duress or coercion). Voluntariness is determined from all the surrounding circumstances. While D’s knowledge of his right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account, it is not an absolute prerequisite to voluntariness – at least when D is not in custody.
• Who can Consent? The easiest cases are those where the D is alleged to have given his consent for himself. The more difficult cases involve third parties giving consent for the D.
• Stoner v California: The Court held that search of a D’s hotel room without his consent, with neither search nor arrest warrants, violated his constitutional rights, despite police having received consent from the hotel clerk.
• But the court permitted consent to apply where the occupant of the apartment has given his consent while the other occupant was absent.
• Consent of third party – Common authority or sufficient relationship: In US v. Matlock, the Court stated that effective consent to a warrantlesss search may be given either by the accused or by any third party who possesses common authority or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected. “Common authority” rests on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control, so that each may be deemed to have assumed the risk that the other would permit the common area to be searched. For example, family members or other persons who share a house or apartment may have sufficient joint access and control over the premises so that the consent of either occupant is effective against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom the premises are shared.
• Apparent authority – Reasonable belief: IL v. Rodriguez.
• Issue: IF the police enter a dwelling based on the reasonable but mistaken belief that a third party who consented to the entry had authority to consent, may evidence found inside be used against the resident of the dwelling?
• Held: Yes. Judgment reversed.
• The 4th amendment does not prohibit the warrantless entry of a dwelling where voluntary consent has be obtained, either from the individual whose property is searched, or from a third party who possesses common authority over the premises.
• Common authority rests on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes. In this case, Fischer had lived in the apartment, but had it moved out before the search. She had a key, but she had taken it without D’s knowledge. Thus, Fischer did not have common authority over D’s apartment.
• The 4th amendment protects only against “unreasonable” searches. A search is reasonable if it is done with the consent of the person. A factual determination made by agents of the government need not be correct, so long as it is reasonable. The issue is not whether the right to be free of searches has been waived by D, but whether the right to be free of unreasonable searches has been violated. If the officers’ determination of consent to enter would “warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief” that the consenting party had authority over the premises, then the search was vaild.
C-ditty
• Schneckloth v. Bustamonte: Nature of Consent
• Facts: Bustamonte (D) and five others were in a car with a burned-out headlight. Police stopped the car; the driver had no license. A passenger, Alcala, had a license and told police the car was his brother’s. Police asked if they could search the car; Alcala said yes and opened the trunk, where police found stolen checks. D was convicted of theft and appeals.
• Issue: In order for a defendant’s consent to be voluntary, must he be warned that he is under no obligation to give his consent?
• Held: No. Conviction sustained.
• (a). The Court held that the consent was voluntary (i.e., not the result of duress or coercion). Voluntariness is determined from all the surrounding circumstances. While D’s knowledge of his right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account, it is not an absolute prerequisite to voluntariness – at least when D is not in custody.
• Who can Consent? The easiest cases are those where the D is alleged to have given his consent for himself. The more difficult cases involve third parties giving consent for the D.
• Stoner v California: The Court held that search of a D’s hotel room without his consent, with neither search nor arrest warrants, violated his constitutional rights, despite police having received consent from the hotel clerk.
• But the court permitted consent to apply where the occupant of the apartment has given his consent while the other occupant was absent.
• Consent of third party – Common authority or sufficient relationship: In US v. Matlock, the Court stated that effective consent to a warrantlesss search may be given either by the accused or by any third party who possesses common authority or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected. “Common authority” rests on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control, so that each may be deemed to have assumed the risk that the other would permit the common area to be searched. For example, family members or other persons who share a house or apartment may have sufficient joint access and control over the premises so that the consent of either occupant is effective against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom the premises are shared.
• Apparent authority – Reasonable belief: IL v. Rodriguez.
• Issue: IF the police enter a dwelling based on the reasonable but mistaken belief that a third party who consented to the entry had authority to consent, may evidence found inside be used against the resident of the dwelling?
• Held: Yes. Judgment reversed.
• The 4th amendment does not prohibit the warrantless entry of a dwelling where voluntary consent has be obtained, either from the individual whose property is searched, or from a third party who possesses common authority over the premises.
• Common authority rests on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes. In this case, Fischer had lived in the apartment, but had it moved out before the search. She had a key, but she had taken it without D’s knowledge. Thus, Fischer did not have common authority over D’s apartment.
• The 4th amendment protects only against “unreasonable” searches. A search is reasonable if it is done with the consent of the person. A factual determination made by agents of the government need not be correct, so long as it is reasonable. The issue is not whether the right to be free of searches has been waived by D, but whether the right to be free of unreasonable searches has been violated. If the officers’ determination of consent to enter would “warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief” that the consenting party had authority over the premises, then the search was vaild.
C-ditty
