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This is about as real as the truth can get in this moment of time!
Canberra, 27 March 2003; 2230
Stratwise Strategic Intelligence
Analysis
There are now clear signs of deficiencies in the broad American approach to the war against Iraq.
To be clear: unless there is a disastrous failure of will in Washington brought on by unacceptable losses, the coalition will win this war. But it seems that victory may take longer and cost more in both lives and treasure than the White House, at least, ever dreamt possible.
All the buzzwords about "network-centric" and "effects-based" warfare - a sort of linguistic celebration of the West's undoubted technological superiority - have been put to the test in the last week or so. The technology will produce victory, but it is not proving to be the anticipated cakewalk. Some very old concepts in military thought are proving their durability.
Key Points
· Technology has yet to master nature in warfare.
· The US lost the psyops campaign.
· The ground war is being fought mostly at points of Iraq's choice.
· The coalition shows signs of rigid thinking.
· The coalition's force:space ratio is worse than in 1991, and Iraq's is better.
Let us take these points one at a time.
Technology and nature
Coalition Apache attack helicopters cannot fly in sandstorms. This has deprived the coalition of one of its key battlefield advantages. It is doubtful whether the Republican Guard could have moved to blocking and counter-offensive positions if the coalition helicopters had been able to operate. The known climatic conditions in the battlespace have diluted a central coalition advantage.
Moreover, if the Iraqis can force coalition ground personnel into their CB suits for extended periods, the ever-increasing heat will begin to degrade the effectiveness of coalition soldiers.
Psyops
The absence of throngs of happy Iraqis welcoming their liberators shows that the Iraqis believe they are defending their country against a foreign invader. This has meant very stiff resistance where the regime chooses to fight. Coalition claims that a whole division (the 51st) had surrendered were proved false when the same division later surfaced in a counterattack near Basra. Collateral damage and casualties caused by errant precision weaponry will not endear the invaders to the civilian population. (Whether a weapon goes astray via mis-targeting, malfunction or enemy action is of course unknown to its victims).
Fighting where Iraq wants to
The coalition is free to move wherever it wishes but the Iraqis have chosen to defend certain points: Umm Qasr, Al Faw, Basra (the reported uprising there seems to have been fictitious or trivial), Najaf, Karbala, Nasariyah and - in due course - Baghdad.
Despite all the coalition's advanced strategic thinking and massive firepower, the war will be decided where Saddam always wanted it to be: in the defensive positions around and inside the capital. The truism that it takes two to have a fight is proving very relevant. The Iraqis have simply established themselves in key positions and, in effect, said: "you want us; come and get us."
Rigid thinking
It has become a coalition mantra that the war is going "according to plan". Yet it is a well known military truism that no battle plan survives contact with the enemy. The coalition has a huge advantage in strategic and tactical mobility. Instead of trying to execute a prewar plan, it should use this advantage and strike the enemy from directions he does not expect.
Force-to-space ratio
There seems to have been a fundamental coalition error stemming from the victory of Bush's civilian coterie over his top military advisors in the prewar planning process. The military wanted DESERT STORM II; the civilians thought it could be done on the cheap. In the event, the civilians seem to have got too much of their way.
In 1991 the coalition fielded over half a million troops (plus equipment and sea and air platforms) for a ground battlespace consisting essentially of Kuwait and southern Iraq. For Iraq in 1991 this was ground that had to be contested. This time the coalition battlespace is the whole of Iraq, but the coalition force is much smaller.
By contrast, for Iraq the 2003 battlespace can be considered to be just those points and areas it chooses to contest. It need not worry about occupying or securing any other space. Thus although its forces too are smaller than in 1991, its force:space ratio is better, whereas the coalition's is worse.
Do not be surprised if additional forces are deployed to the theatre before this war can be decided.
Conclusion
As stated, the coalition will win this war but it may well take longer and take more lives than expected.
Gary Brown
Stratwise Senior Associate
Canberra, 27 March 2003; 2230
Stratwise Strategic Intelligence
Analysis
There are now clear signs of deficiencies in the broad American approach to the war against Iraq.
To be clear: unless there is a disastrous failure of will in Washington brought on by unacceptable losses, the coalition will win this war. But it seems that victory may take longer and cost more in both lives and treasure than the White House, at least, ever dreamt possible.
All the buzzwords about "network-centric" and "effects-based" warfare - a sort of linguistic celebration of the West's undoubted technological superiority - have been put to the test in the last week or so. The technology will produce victory, but it is not proving to be the anticipated cakewalk. Some very old concepts in military thought are proving their durability.
Key Points
· Technology has yet to master nature in warfare.
· The US lost the psyops campaign.
· The ground war is being fought mostly at points of Iraq's choice.
· The coalition shows signs of rigid thinking.
· The coalition's force:space ratio is worse than in 1991, and Iraq's is better.
Let us take these points one at a time.
Technology and nature
Coalition Apache attack helicopters cannot fly in sandstorms. This has deprived the coalition of one of its key battlefield advantages. It is doubtful whether the Republican Guard could have moved to blocking and counter-offensive positions if the coalition helicopters had been able to operate. The known climatic conditions in the battlespace have diluted a central coalition advantage.
Moreover, if the Iraqis can force coalition ground personnel into their CB suits for extended periods, the ever-increasing heat will begin to degrade the effectiveness of coalition soldiers.
Psyops
The absence of throngs of happy Iraqis welcoming their liberators shows that the Iraqis believe they are defending their country against a foreign invader. This has meant very stiff resistance where the regime chooses to fight. Coalition claims that a whole division (the 51st) had surrendered were proved false when the same division later surfaced in a counterattack near Basra. Collateral damage and casualties caused by errant precision weaponry will not endear the invaders to the civilian population. (Whether a weapon goes astray via mis-targeting, malfunction or enemy action is of course unknown to its victims).
Fighting where Iraq wants to
The coalition is free to move wherever it wishes but the Iraqis have chosen to defend certain points: Umm Qasr, Al Faw, Basra (the reported uprising there seems to have been fictitious or trivial), Najaf, Karbala, Nasariyah and - in due course - Baghdad.
Despite all the coalition's advanced strategic thinking and massive firepower, the war will be decided where Saddam always wanted it to be: in the defensive positions around and inside the capital. The truism that it takes two to have a fight is proving very relevant. The Iraqis have simply established themselves in key positions and, in effect, said: "you want us; come and get us."
Rigid thinking
It has become a coalition mantra that the war is going "according to plan". Yet it is a well known military truism that no battle plan survives contact with the enemy. The coalition has a huge advantage in strategic and tactical mobility. Instead of trying to execute a prewar plan, it should use this advantage and strike the enemy from directions he does not expect.
Force-to-space ratio
There seems to have been a fundamental coalition error stemming from the victory of Bush's civilian coterie over his top military advisors in the prewar planning process. The military wanted DESERT STORM II; the civilians thought it could be done on the cheap. In the event, the civilians seem to have got too much of their way.
In 1991 the coalition fielded over half a million troops (plus equipment and sea and air platforms) for a ground battlespace consisting essentially of Kuwait and southern Iraq. For Iraq in 1991 this was ground that had to be contested. This time the coalition battlespace is the whole of Iraq, but the coalition force is much smaller.
By contrast, for Iraq the 2003 battlespace can be considered to be just those points and areas it chooses to contest. It need not worry about occupying or securing any other space. Thus although its forces too are smaller than in 1991, its force:space ratio is better, whereas the coalition's is worse.
Do not be surprised if additional forces are deployed to the theatre before this war can be decided.
Conclusion
As stated, the coalition will win this war but it may well take longer and take more lives than expected.
Gary Brown
Stratwise Senior Associate
